Nils Bulling

Tutorial on 15 and 16/07/15

Reasoning About Cooperation in Multi-Player Game Settings

In this tutorial we discuss how to model and how to reason about the
power of teams of agents in game-like scenarios. We look at an
abstract formalism to model the power of coalitions in games and
discuss under which assumptions these abstract models correspond to
power in normal form games. In the second part of the tutorial we
discuss logics to reason about the power of coalitions. We introduce
Coalition Logic and Alternating-Time Temporal Logic and illustrate how
to specify intuitive properties of coalitions in game-like
scenarios. We also discuss an axiomatic system of Coalition Logic
which can be used as an algorithmic method to derive new
information. Finally, we briefly review how semantic variants of ATL
characterize different general properties of perfect and imperfect
information games.